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SHOULD AN AIR CARRIER BE LIABLE FOR
FAILING TO VERIFY A FORGED CERTIFIED
CHECK UNDER A C.O.D. CONTRACT?
MICHAEL L. GRAVELLE
A COLLECT ON DELIVERY (C.O.D.) contract re-
quires a carrier to collect upon delivery from the con-
signee a specified amount for the shipper.' In addition, a
carrier must collect its own delivery charges from the con-
signee. 2 In the event that a carrier does not collect pay-
ment, it is required to return the goods to the shipper. s A
C.O.D. shipment can only arise by an express or implied
contract.4 A carrier is never under a common law duty to
I BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 233 (5th ed. 1979). '"Collect on delivery.' These
letters import the carrier's liability to the consignor [shipper] to collect the cost of
the goods from the consignee, and, if not collected, to return the goods to the
consignor (shipper]." Id.
2 13 AM. JuR. 2D Carriers § 454 (1964). Section 454 states:
A c.o.d. (collect on delivery) shipment is made under a contract
whereby the carrier undertakes to collect from the consignee, upon
delivery, a specified amount for and on behalf of the consignor
(shipper], in addition to the carrier's own charges. Thus, a carrier
receiving goods on a c.o.d. shipment acts in two capacities - as a
bailee to transport the goods and as agent to collect the price of
goods. To act as the collecting agent of the consignor [shipper] is
not a duty imposed upon the carrier by the common law, but is a
matter of private contract, express or implied, which the carrier may
enter into or refuse at its option.
Jd.; see justin v. Delta Motor Line, 43 So. 2d 53, 55 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (carrier is
required to collect the purchase price of the goods and the transportation
charges).
See supra note I for the definition of C.O.D.
13 CJ.S. Carriers § 186a (1939). Section 186a states:
The peculiarity of shipment of goods c.o.d. (meaning collect on de-
livery), which is usually undertaken only by express companies, is
that a condition is attached that the carrier on delivery to the con-
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act as the shipper's collecting agent.5 At all times, a car-
rier has complete discretion in determining whether to
enter into a C.O.D. contract.6
In general, a carrier that receives goods under a C.O.D.
contract acts in two capacities: as a bailee in transporting
the goods, and as an agent in collecting the price.7 A car-
rier's transportation duty is governed by common law.8
Accordingly, when a carrier breaches its duty to carry and
deliver goods, it is liable to the shipper for the value of
signee shall collect a specified sum of money, usually the purchase
price of the goods (and other than transportation charges), shall re-
turn the sum thus collected to the consignor [shipper]. Since it is
well settled that there is no common-law duty devolving on an ex-
press company or other common carrier to act as the collecting
agent of the shipper, such obligation arises only contract express or
implied, and is one which the carrier may enter into or refuse at its
option.
Id.; see Rolla Produce Co. v. American Ry. Express, 205 Mo. App. 646, 226 S.W.
582, 582 (1920) (the express terms of the shipment were C.O.D.); Anthony v.
American Express Co., 188 N.C. 407, 124 S.E. 753, 754 (1924) (a carrier's collec-
tion obligation arises only by an express or implied contract).
Justin, 43 So. 2d at 55 (there is no common law duty on a carrier to act as the
shipper's collecting agent); see supra note 2 for a discussion of section 454; see also
supra note 4 for a discussion of section 186a.
6 Justin, 43 So. 2d at 55 (a carrier may enter into or refuse to enter into a C.O.D.
contract); Anthony, 124 S.E. at 754 (a carrier has the option of deciding whether to
enter into a C.O.D. contract); see supra note 2 for a discussion of section 454; see
also supra note 4 for a discussion of section 186a.
7 The following cases have held that when a carrier enters into a C.O.D. con-
tract, it acts in two capacities: as a bailee in transporting the goods, and as an
agent in collecting the C.O.D. charges. Littleton Stamp & Coin Co. v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 778 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1985); Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc.,
573 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1978); Mountain States Waterbed Distrib. Inc. v.
O.N.C. Freight Sys. Corp., 44 Colo. App. 433, 614 P.2d 906, 907 (1980); Bond
Rubber Corp. v. Oates Bros., Inc., 136 Conn. 248, 70 A.2d 115, 117 (1949); Wil-
Ier v. Railway Express Agency, 86 A.2d 104, 107 (D.C. 1952); Tyler Refrigeration
Corp. v. IML Freight, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 718, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981);Justin, 43
So. 2d at 55; Barnhart v. Henderson, 147 Neb. 689, 24 N.W.2d 854, 861 (1947);
Okin v. Railway Express Agency, 24 N.J. Misc. 8, 44 A.2d 896 (1945);Joseph Mo-
gul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708, 709 (1928); Anthony,
124 S.E. at 754; Nuside Metal Prod., Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 189 Pa. Super.
593, 152 A.2d 275, 279 (1959); Crown Displays, Inc. v. Calore Freight Sys., Inc.,
115 R.I. 483, 348 A.2d 373, 374 (1975); Herrin Transp. Co. v. Robert E. Olson
Co., 325 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
K Nuside Metal Prod., Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 593, 152 A.2d
275, 279 (1959) ("the carrier's liability for proper transportation does not arise
from contract, but is cast upon it by the common law.").
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those goods. 9 By comparison, a carrier's collection duty
is governed by agency principles.' 0 Accordingly, when a
carrier breaches its duty to collect the price it is liable to
the shipper for whatever could have been collected."
Under agency principles, a carrier has the duty to use
either reasonable or ordinary care in making its collection
efforts.' 2 It is important to recognize, however, that a car-
rier's duty of reasonable care applies only in accordance
with the shipper's directions.'3 If a carrier fails to abide
Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708, 709
(1928) ("for breach of its duty as bailee to carry and deliver to the person and on
the conditions stated by the shipper, it [the carrier] is liable, as in the case of any
other misdelivery, for the value of the goods.").
to See supra note 7 for a list of cases which have held that a carrier's collection
duty is governed by agency principles.
11 Joseph Mogul, 159 N.E. at 709; ("for breach of its duty to act as agent for the
shipper in collection of the price, it (the carrier] is liable, like any other collection
agent, for whatever could have been collected if the duty had been fulfilled.").
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 426 (1957). Section 426 states: "Un-
less otherwise agreed, an agent employed to collect from others goods or money
due the principal has a duty of using reasonable care and skill in making such
collections in accordance with the directions of the principal." let; see also 3 CJ.S.
Agency § 304a (1973). Section 304a states:
An agent to collect a debt or claim must exercise ordinary care, skill,
and diligence in the performance of all the duties incident to the
undertaking, and will be liable to his principal for any loss which his
negligence in this respect may occasion. If the agent has acted in
good faith and with ordinary care, skill, and diligence he will not be
liable, except in cases where he has guaranteed the collection; nor
will he be liable if the principal himself has prevented him from col-
lecting.
What will amount to due care on the part of the agent will depend
upon the nature of the undertaking and all the circumstances in the
particular case. If the agent is unable to make a collection intrusted
to him, it is his duty to notify the principal, and he must return the
note or other obligations intrusted to him or furnish a sufficient ex-
cuse for not doing so. A mere offer to return them after a lapse of
time is not sufficient to relieve him from liability unless he shows
that he has used due care and diligence in endeavoring to collect
them.
Id
1S Littleton Stamp & Coin Co. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 778 F.2d 53, 55 (1st Cir.
1985). A carrier is under a duty to use reasonable care in collecting payments in
accordance with the directions of the principal. Oftentimes a principal directs the
carrier to accept cash, certified check, money order, traveler's check, company
check, or a combination of one or more. Under agency laws, it is the responsibil-
tiy of the carrier to use reasonable care in complying with the principal's direc-
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by the shipper's directions, the issue of reasonable care is
irrevelant and the carrier has unquestionably breached its
C.O.D. contract.14 Consequently, in a situation where a
carrier enters into a C.O.D. contract with a shipper, courts
will follow the general rule that a carrier will be held to
strict compliance with its agreement.' 5
This comment will begin by providing a history on how
courts have analyzed and applied this general rule be-
tween the period 1875 and 1967 in eight significant
C.O.D. cases.' 6 The second section of this comment will
discuss the principles of waiver and ratification as it affects
the general rule.17 Finally, this comment will analyze two
contemporary issues involving C.O.D. contracts.' The
first issue concerns the standard of care required of a car-
rier when undertaking to perform collection activities pur-
suant to a C.O.D. contract.' 9 The second issue concerns
whether a carrier should be liable for failing to verify a
forged certified check that it accepted as payment pursu-
ant to a C.O.D. contract.20
tions. Id. at 55-56; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 426 (1957); see also
supra note 12 for a discussion of section 426.
,4 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 56.
15 Annotation, Liability of Carrier for Delivering Goods Sent C.O.D. Without Receiving
Cash Payment, 27 A.L.R.3D 1320, 1327 (1969).
It has been generally held or recognized ... that a carrier who enters
into an express c.o.d. contract with a consignor [shipper], or other-
wise expressly or impliedly agrees to transport certain goods on the
condition that he will receive payment from the consignee prior to
delivery, will be held to a strict compliance with his agreement.
Thus where a carrier violates his contract and delivers the goods
without collecting the price from the consignee, the carrier will be
held liable to the consignor [shipper].
Id.
See infra notes 21-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases that
have adopted the general rule.
'7 See infra notes 95-149 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver and
ratification.
18 See infra notes 150-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of contempo-
rary C.O.D. issues.
it, See infra notes 154-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the modem
standard of due care.
'1, See infra notes 203-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of the verifica-
tion issue.
I. A CARRIER'S CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY UNDER A
C.O.D. CONTRACT
In a situation where a carrier enters into a C.O.D. con-
tract with a shipper, courts will follow the general rule
that a carrier will be held to strict compliance with its
agreement. 2' This means that a carrier has agreed to
transport certain goods on the condition that it will collect
payment from the consignee prior to delivery.2 2 If a car-
rier delivers the goods without collecting payment, the
carrier will be liable to the shipper for damages. 23
A. Early Cases Establishing the General Rule
of Strict Compliance
One of the first early cases that discussed the nature
and importance of the letters "C.O.D." was State v. Intoxi-
cating Liquors.24 In 1882, the Maine Supreme Court stated
that the initials C.O.D. mean "collect on delivery, or more
fully stated, deliver upon payment of the charges due the
seller for the price, and the carrier for the carriage of the
goods. These initials have acquired a fixed and determi-
nate meaning which courts and juries may recognize from
their general information. ' 25 As such, both the shipper
and consignee have a qualified right to possession of a
C.O.D. shipment.26 The shipper has the right to posses-
sion upon the consignee's neglect or refusal to pay for the
goods. Conversely, the consignee has the right to pos-
session by paying for the goods.28
Another late nineteenth century case that established
the general rule of strict compliance was Murray v.
" See supra note 15 at 1327; see also infra notes 24-94 and accompanying text for
a discussion of cases that have adopted this general rule.
=, See supra note 15 at 1327; see also infra notes 24-94 and accompanying text for
a discussion of cases that have adopted this general rule.
23 See supra note 15 at 1327.
24 73 Me. 278 (1882).
25 Id. at 279.
20 Id
27 Id
28 Id at 279-80.
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Warner.29 In Murray, the shipper instructed the carrier to
deliver a coat and vest to the consignee, and in return re-
ceive six spring bed-bottoms.30 The carrier subsequently
made delivery, but did not collect the bed-bottoms or
their value in money.31 In 1875, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held the carrier liable for negligent mis-
delivery of the goods.32 The court reasoned that a carrier
could not disregard the conditions upon which the deliv-
ery was authorized. When the consignee refused to
make payment to the carrier, the carrier could have dis-
charged itself from liability by placing the goods in stor-
age, notifying the shipper for further instructions, or
returning the goods to the shipper.3 4 In any case, the car-
rier cannot, after having undertaken to carry the goods on
a C.O.D. basis, relieve itself of liability by simply aban-
doning the goods with the consignee. 5
One of the first early twentieth century cases that estab-
lished the general rule was Anthony v. American Express Co. 3 6
In Anthony, the carrier contractually agreed to collect pay-
ment from the consignee upon delivery of the goods, and
to remit the charges to the shipper.3 7 The carrier made
2 55 N.H. 546 (1875).
so Id.
Id. In Murray, the consignee was a boarder in an Amesbury, New Hampshire,
hotel. When the carrier attempted to make delivery, the consignee was no where
to be found. The carrier left the goods with the hotel clerk but did not collect
payment. Several days later the consignee received the goods from the hotel clerk
without making payment. Eventually, the shipper sued the carrier for negligent
misdelivery. Id. at 546-48.
32 Id. at 548. The New Hampshire Supreme Court entered a judgment on the
verdict in favor of the shipper. Id at 551.
- Id. at 549.
- Id. In Murray, the carrier did not place the goods in storage, ask for further
instructions, or return the goods to the shipper when the consignee was not pres-
ent to accept delivery. Instead, the carrier left the goods with the clerk of the hotel
where the consignee was staying and stated that he had "nothing to do with
them." Id.
- Id.
" 188 N.C. 407, 124 S.E. 753 (1924).
•" Id. at 754. The contract between the shipper and the carrier was evidenced
by the carrier's receipts. These receipts contained the name of the shipper, the
name and address of the consignee, a description of the goods, the letters
"C.O.D.", and figures showing the amounts to be collected. Id.
[53
delivery and collected payment, but failed to remit the
payment back to the shipper.38 In 1924, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held the carrier liable for breach of
contract in failing to remit the payment to the shipper.3 9
The court reasoned that a C.O.D. obligation arises only
by contract, and is one which the carrier can enter into or
refuse.4 0 Accordingly, if a carrier chooses to enter into a
C.O.D. contract, it will be bound to strict compliance with
the agreement. 1
In Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc. ,42 the carrier
made delivery of goods under a C.O.D. contract to the
consignee.48 The carrier failed to collect cash; instead, ac-
cepting the consignee's certified check.44 Subsequently,
the shipper discovered that the certified check was a
worthless forgery. 45 In 1928, the New York Court of Ap-
peals held the carrier liable.46 The court reasoned that a
carrier who receives goods under a C.O.D. contract acts
in two capacities: as a bailee to transport the goods, and
as an agent to collect the price.47 In general, when a car-
rier breaches its duty to transport the goods under C.O.D.
contract, it will be liable to the shipper for the value of
those goods.48 In addition, when a carrier breaches its
duty to collect the price, it will be liable to the shipper for
- Id.
so Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Id. at 755.
4oId at 754-55.
I4S ld at 755.
4 47 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708 (1928).
4, I at 709.
44 Id.
45 Id The shipper sued the carrier on the theory that the carrier, by the accept-
ance of the check as a substitute for cash, made the consignee's debt its own. Id.
.4 Id. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's summary
judgment verdict for the shipper. The court held that the shipper's measure of
recovery is based upon the loss that it suffered, not because the carrier assumed
the consignee's debt. Id
4, Id.; see supra note 7 for a list of cases that have cited this principle.
- Joseph Mogul, 159 N.E. at 709; see Fowler v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 98 Mo.
App. 210, 71 S.W. 1077, 1078 (1903) (carrier will be liable for the full value ofthe
goods if it does not make delivery to the correct party).
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whatever could have been collected. 49 The law is settled
that, in the absence of an agreement or custom to the con-
trary, a carrier must collect money and nothing else under
a C.O.D. contract.50
B. Modern Cases Interpreting the General Rule of Strict
Compliance
One of the first modem cases that interpreted the gen-
eral rule of strict compliance was Okin v. Railway Express
Agency. 5 In Okin, the carrier agreed to deliver a diamond
ring from the shipper to the consignee on a C.O.D. ba-
sis. 5 2 The carrier breached the C.O.D. agreement by mak-
ing delivery, and failing to collect payment.5" In 1945, the
New Jersey Supreme Court held the carrier liable for
breach of contract.5 4 The court reasoned that since there
was not any common law duty on a carrier to act as the
shipper's collecting agent, such obligation arose only by
express or implied contract.5 5 When a carrier makes a
contract to collect on delivery and later breaches the con-
tract, the carrier is liable to the shipper for whatever the
carrier would have collected.56 This is because the under-
lying purpose of C.O.D. contract is to prevent the carrier
from making delivery without collecting payment.57
Another modem case that interpreted the general rule
40 Joseph Mogul, 159 N.E. at 709. The court stated, "[flor breach of its duty to
act as agent for the shipper in the collection of the price, it is liable, like any other
collection agent, for whatever could have been collected if the duty had been ful-
filled." Id.
o Id. at 709; see Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U.S. 160, 165 (1923) (it is
settled law that a collecting agent is without authority to accept for the debt of his
principal anything but that which the law declares to be a legal tender).
51 24 NJ. Misc. 8, 44 A.2d 896 (1945).
5I2 at 897.
5' Id
- Id. at 896. The New Jersey Supreme Court struck out the carrier's answer
and entered judgment for the shipper. Id. at 898.
', Id. at 897; see supra note 4 for a discussion of section 186a.
Cl, Okin, 44 A.2d at 897; see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Joseph Mogul.
70kin, 44 A.2d at 897.
was Nuside Metal Products, Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc. 58 In Nu-
side, the shipper delivered two shipments of steel to an ini-
tial carrier under a C.O.D. contract.59 The initial carrier
delivered the steel to a connecting carrier, which collected
payment from the consignee.6 0  The connecting carrier
deposited the consignee's check, and sent two of its own
checks to the shipper, which were subsequently dishon-
ored.6 1 In 1959, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
the initial carrier liable for the value of the two C.O.D.
shipments.6 2 The court reasoned that a carrier handling a
C.O.D. shipment acts in two capacities: as a bailee to
transport the goods and as an agent to collect the price.65
Generally, the carrier's liability to transport the goods
arises by common law; while its liability to collect the
price arises by contract.64 Accordingly, when a carrier
makes a contract to collect on delivery it is bound to strict
compliance with its agreement. 5
In Hen-in Transportation Co. v. Robert E. Olson Co. ,63 the
shipper delivered a C.O.D. shipment to Gulf Coast Ex-
press, Inc. for delivery to a consignee.67 Gulf Coast Ex-
press, Inc. delivered the shipment to Herrin
Transportation Co., which failed to place the C.O.D. no-
189 Pa. Super. 593, 152 A.2d 275 (1959).
"' Id at 277.
oId
a' Id. The connecting carrier filed a petition of bankruptcy shortly after it had
sent its two checks to the shipper. Upon receiving notice of the connecting car-
rier's bankruptcy petition, the shipper filed a claim to collect under the C.O.D.
contract with the connecting carrier's bankruptcy trustee. At the time of the ship-
per's suit against the initial carrier, it had not received any payment from the
trustee of the bankrupt connecting carrier. Id.
62 Id. at 279. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment of the
lower court. Id.
,13 Id.; see supra note 7 for a list of cases which have held a carrier's collection
duty is governed by agency principles.
- Nuside, 152 A.2d at 279; see Robinson Elec. Co. v. Capitol Trucking Corp.,
168 Pa. Super. 430, 79 A.2d 123, 125 (1951) (a carrier's liability to transport
goods arises by common law); 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 186a (1939); see also supra note 4
for a discussion of section 186a.
Nuside, 152 A.2d at 279.
rn 325 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Id. at 827.
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tation on its waybills.68 Herrin Transportation Co. deliv-
ered the shipment, without the C.O.D. notation, to Five
Transportation Co.6 9  Five Transportation Co. subse-
quently made delivery of the shipment but failed to collect
payment.7 ° In 1959, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
granted recovery to the shipper against the first two carri-
ers.7' In so holding, the court reasoned that a carrier that
receives goods on a C.O.D. basis acts in two capacities: as
a bailee to transport the goods and as an agent to collect
the price. 2 If a carrier breaches its duty to deliver the
goods it is liable for the value of those goods." If, how-
ever, the carrier breaches its duty to collect the price, it is
liable for whatever could have been collected had the duty
been fulfilled.74
Finally, in National Van Lines v. Rich Plan Corp. ,75 the car-
rier delivered twelve refrigerators to the consignee under
a C.O.D. contract that required the carrier to collect
cash.76 The carrier, instead of collecting cash, collected
the consignee's company check as payment.77 The follow-
ing day the consignee stopped payment on the company




' Id. at 828. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals also granted recovery to the
initial carrier against the second carrier; and affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Id. at 828-29.
7 Id. at 827; see supra note 7 for a list of cases which have held that a carrier's
collection duty is governed by agency principles.
,- Herrin, 325 S.W.2d at 827; see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc.
SHerrin, 325 S.W.2d at 827; see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc.
75 385 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1967).
- Id. at 801. The C.O.D. contract stated that, "[t]he carrier will not deliver or
relinquish possession of any property transported by it until all tariff rates and
charges thereon have been paid in cash, money order (other than a personal
money order), traveler's check, cashier's check, bank treasurer's check or certified
check. . . " Id. at 802.
" Id. In addition to executing delivery of a company check to the carrier, the
consignee also signed the carrier's bill of lading in the box marked, "Consignee's
Acknowledgment of Delivery." Id
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represented.78 The carrier repossessed the refrigerators
and informed the shipper of the consignee's contention. 9
The shipper, however, refused to alter the sales price or
accept the return of the goods. 80 Consequently, the car-
rier placed the refrigerators in storage and sued the ship-
per for its freight and storage charges."' The shipper
counterclaimed seeking recovery of the contract price. 2
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals awarded nothing to
the carrier on its original claim and full recovery to the
shipper on its counterclaim. The court reasoned that a
carrier under a C.O.D. contract has a dual function: as a
bailee to transport the goods, and as the shipper's agent
to collect the price from the consignee.8 4 Moreover, the
duty imposed on the carrier to act as the shipper's collect-
ing agent does not arise out of common law.85 Rather,
this collection duty is created by contract.8 Accordingly,
the carrier was bound to strict compliance with its C.O.D.
70 rdj
soId.
ti Id. At the time of this suit, the refrigerators still remained in storage. Id
" Id.
"1 Id. at 801-02. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
The court also stated that the parties entered a pretrial stipulation as follows: The
issue is
Whether... the act of the plaintiff [carrier], in accepting the check
... constituted such a violation of the tariff and contract of carriage
as to make plaintiff liable to the defendant [shipper] for the amount
of the C.O.D. charges. If so defendant is entitled to recover on its
counterclaim. If not, plaintiff is entitled to recover its freight and
storage charges.
Id at 802. Because the parties' pretrial stipulation is couched in "either/or" lan-
guage, and there was no attempt by the carrier to show that the shipper could
have mitigated its damages, the Fifth Circuit awarded full recovery to the shipper.
Id. at 803-04.
- Id. at 802; see supra note 7 for a list of cases that cite this principle.
- National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see also Young v. Santa Fe Trail Corp., 179
Kan. 678, 298 P.2d 235, 237 (1956) (a C.O.D. contract creates a special service
outside the scope of the carrier's public service duty so that liability rests upon a
contractual basis).
,- National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802. For a discussion of the rule that a car-
rier's duty to collect under a C.O.D. contract is created by contract, see Justin v.
Delta Motor Lines, Inc., 43 So. 2d 53, 55 (La. Ct. App. 1940);Joseph Mogul, Inc.
v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708, 709 (1928); and Herrin
Transp. Co. v. Robert E. Olson Co., 325 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
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contract, and thus accepted the consignee's personal
check at its own risk.87 Because the carrier breached its
contractual duty to the shipper, it was liable for whatever
could have been collected.88
C. Summary
This section provided a history on how courts have ana-
lyzed eight significant C.O.D. cases.89 The fact patterns in
each of these eight cases were basically the same. The
shipper entered into a C.O.D. contract with the carrier,
the carrier delivered the goods, but failed to remit full
payment back to the shipper. As a result, the court held
the carrier liable for breach of contract. 90
In so holding, courts rationalized their decisions using a
four step procedure. This procedure can be summarized
as follows: (1) a carrier who receives goods under a
C.O.D. contract acts in two capacities: as a bailee to trans-
port the goods and as an agent to collect the price;91 (2) a
carrier's liability to transport the goods arises by common
law, while a carrier's liability to collect the price arises by
contract;92 (3) a carrier has complete discretion in deter-
87 National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see Channing v. Riddle Aviation Co., 203
Misc. 844, 119 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (1953) (if a carrier accepts a check in lieu of
cash, it does so at its own risk);Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 220
App. Div. 287, 221 N.Y.S. 391, 395 (1927) (a C.O.D. shipment of goods contem-
plates that a carrier will collect the amount specified in cash, and, if a check is
accepted in lieu thereof, it is done at the peril of the carrier), rev'd on other grounds,
247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708 (1928).
ON National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see Herrin, 325 S.W.2d at 827 (when the
carrier breaches its duty to act as agent for the shipper in collection of the price, it
is liable for whatever could have been collected if the duty had been fulfilled);
Justin, 43 So. 2d at 57 (carrier is liable, like any other collection agent, for
whatever could have been collected);Joseph Mogul, 159 N.E. at 709 (for breach of
its duty to act as agent for the shipper in the collection of the price, the carrier is
liable, like any other collection agent, for whatever could have been collected if
the duty had been fulfilled).
", See supra notes 24-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of these eight
C.O.D. cases.
IN, See supra notes 29-88 and accompanying text for examples of when the courts
held the carrier liable for breach of contract.
9' See supra note 7 for a list of cases which have held that a carrier's collection
duty is governed by agency principles.
11 See National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see also supra notes 75-88 and accompa-
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mining whether to enter into a C.O.D. contract;93 and (4)
if a carrier decides to enter into a C.O.D. contract, it will
be held to strict compliance with its agreement. 94 Conse-
quently, in a situation where a carrier enters into an ex-
press C.O.D. contract with a shipper, courts will follow
the general rule that a carrier will be held to strict compli-
ance with its agreement.
II. WAIVER AND RATIFICATION
In contrast to Section I that analyzed cases in which
only the carrier violated the terms of the C.O.D. con-
tract,95 Section II analyzes cases in which both the carrier
and the shipper violate the terms of the C.O.D. contract.9 6
Normally, the carrier violates the terms of the C.O.D. con-
tract by accepting payment in a form other than that au-
thorized in the contract. Correspondingly, the shipper
violates the terms of the C.O.D. contract by accepting this
unauthorized payment. In this situation, the issue be-
comes whether the shipper ratified the carrier's act, and
thus waived its opportunity to contest.
A. Waiver and Ratification Established
The first major case to utilize the principles of waiver
and ratification in a C.O.D. context was Rathbun v. Citizens
Steamboat Co. 97 In Rathbun, the shipper sent articles of per-
nying text for a discussion of National Van Lines; see Okin v. Railway Express
Agency, 24 N.J. Misc. 8, 44 A.2d 896, 897 (1945); see also supra notes 51-57 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Ohin; see Nuside Metal Prod., Inc. v. Eazor
Express, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 593, 152 A.2d 275, 279 (1959); see also supra notes
58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nuside.
11 See Anthony v. American Express Co., 188 N.C. 407, 124 S.E. 753, 754-55
(1924); see also supra notes 36.41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Anthony.
See National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see also supra notes 75-88 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of National Van Lines; see Anthony, 124 S.E. at 755; see also
supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Anthony; see Nuside,
152 A.2d at 279; see also supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Nuside.
"5 See supra notes 21-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section I.
- See infra notes 96-149 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section II.
76 N.Y. 376 (1879).
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sonal property to the consignee on a C.O.D. basis with the
understanding that the carrier was to deliver the goods
and accept only cash.98 The carrier subsequently deliv-
ered the goods, but accepted the consignee's check as
payment for the C.O.D. order.9 The carrier then gave
this check to the shipper, who deposited it into its bank
account. 00 A short time later, the check was returned to
the shipper because of insufficient funds, and the shipper
sued the carrier.10 ' The carrier defended this action by
claiming that the shipper waived the cash only require-
ment by unconditionally accepting the consignee's
check.' 0 2 In 1879, the New York Court of Appeals found
that the shipper adopted and ratified the carrier's acts by
the unqualified acceptance of the consignee's check.' 03
The court reasoned that knowledge of all material facts
was indispensable in order to bind the shipper by ratifica-
tion. 0 4 In this case, the shipper unconditionally accepted
the consignee's check, instead of cash.'05 Therefore, the
shipper ratified and adopted the carrier's act.'0 6 More-
over, if the shipper intended to merely aid the carrier in
getting the money, the shipper should have made a quali-
fied acceptance or refused to accept the check.10 7
Bond Rubber Corp. v. Oates Bros., Inc.,108 also involved a
' Id. at 378.
w" Id.
cmId
" Id. The New York Court of Appeals stated the issue as follows, "whether the
unconditioned acceptance of the check did not amount to a waiver of the require-
ment to collect the money or a ratification of the act of receiving the check in lieu
of the money." Id.
Is. /d.
", Id. at 380-81. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
lower court. Id. at 381.
- Id. at 379; see Nixon v. Palmer, 8 N.Y. 398, 401 (1853) (in order to make the
ratification of an unauthorized act binding, it must be made with full knowledge of
the facts affecting the rights of the principal).
Rathbun, 76 N.Y. at 379.
Id. at 380. The shipper assumed the risk that the consignee's check would
be returned for insufficient funds when it accepted and deposited the check. Id. at
379-80.
-" Id. at 380
-- 136 Conn. 248, 70 A.2d 115 (1949).
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shipper ratifying the unauthorized acts of a carrier. In
Bond the shipper sent two C.O.D. shipments to the con-
signee. 109 For each shipment the carrier was contractually
bound to accept either cash or certified checks. 110 On
each shipment, however, the carrier accepted an uncerti-
fled check from the consignee and mailed that check to
the shipper."' The shipper accepted and deposited this
uncertified check into its bank account without objec-
tion."12 Later, this check was returned to the shipper be-
cause of insufficient funds. 113 The shipper sued, and the
carrier defended the action by claiming that the shipper
waived its right to collect cash or a certified check when it
accepted the consignee's uncertified check. 14 In 1949,
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held for the carrier." 15
The court reasoned that the shipper ratified the acts of
the carrier by accepting the consignee's uncertified
checks." 6 A ratification results when the shipper accepts
the carrier's act with an intent to ratify and with full
knowledge of all material circumstances."17  Here, the
1- Id. at 116.
,,o Id. at 117. The carrier's bills of lading stated that the shipper required
either cash or certified check. Id.
,it Id at 116.
112 Id
" Id In addition to the fact that the checks were uncertified, they were also
postdated. On September 12 and 16, 1947, the shipper turned over to the carrier
two C.O.D. shipments of goods for delivery to consignee in New York. On Sep-
tember 17, the carrier made its first delivery and accepted an uncertified check
dated September 19. On September 22, the carrier made its second delivery and
accepted an uncertified check dated September 26. The carrier mailed each of
these checks to the shipper on the day following delivery. Attached to the check
was the C.O.D. remittance slip showing the date of delivery. On each occasion the
shipper's bookkeeper marked the accounts as "Paid" and deposited the checks.
Later, all the checks were returned to the shipper as unpaid because of insufficient
funds. Id.
,,4 Id at 116-17.
"., Id. at 118. The Supreme Court of Connecticut did not find error in the
conclusion of the trial court that the shipper ratified the carrier's acceptance of the
uncertified checks. Id.
1-0 Id. at 117.
If Id.; see Cyclone Fence Co. v. McAviney, 121 Conn. 656, 186 A. 635, 638
(1936) (the acceptance of the results of the act with an intent to ratify, and with
full knowledge of all material circumstances, is a ratification); see also Meriden
Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller, 88 Conn. 157, 162, 90 A. 228, 229 (1914) (a
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shipper unconditionally accepted two uncertified checks
with full knowledge that these checks were uncertified. 118
In Mountain States Waterbed Distributors, Inc. v. 0.N.C
Freight Systems Corp.,"9 the carrier contractually agreed to
deliver goods on a C.O.D. basis and to accept only a cash-
ier's check as payment from the consignee. 120 The carrier
subsequently delivered the goods and accepted the con-
signee's company check, rather than a cashier's check, as
payment.' 21 The carrier then remitted the company check
to the shipper who deposited the check into its bank ac-
count.1 22 Later the company check was dishonored and
the shipper sued the carrier for failure to obtain payment
by means of a cashier's check.' 2- The Colorado Court of
Appeals held that the carrier was not liable to the shipper
because the shipper ratified the actions of the carrier by
depositing the consignee's company check. 24 The court
reasoned that the shipper's unconditional acceptance of a
form of payment not authorized by the C.O.D. contract
constituted a ratification of the carrier's act.'2 5 As such,
the shipper waived its claim against the carrier for breach
of contract. 26
In 1972, the Civil Court of the City of New York consid-
ered, in Compuknit Industries v. Mercury Motors Express,
Inc. , 127whether the 93 year old holding in Rathbun v. Citi-
question of intent is a question of fact, the determination of which is not review-
able unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is one which cannot reasonably be
made).
-18 Bond, 70 A.2d at 117.
119 44 Colo. App. 433, 614 P.2d 906 (1980).
., Id. at 906.
121 Id.
1'2 Id.
23 I In the lower court decision, the Superior Court of the City and County
of Denver entered an order in favor of the shipper on its claim for damages be-
cause the carrier failed to obtain payment in the form of a cashier's check. Id.
124 Id. at 908. The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the
lower court. Id
125 Id at 907; see Rathbun v. Citizens Steamboat Co., 76 N.Y. 376 (1879); see also
supra notes 97-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rathbun.
Mountain States, 614 P.2d at 906.
'2 72 Misc. 2d 55, 337 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
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zens Steamboat Co.,128 still controlled. The fact situation in
Compuknit closely matched the one described in Rath-
bun. ' 29 The Civil Court of the City of New York held that
the Rathbun doctrine still stands as valid precedent despite
its venerable age. 3 0 The court stated, "this Court sees no
necessity to change its applicability merely because of its
age."' 3'1 The shipper "made its bed and now it must sleep
in it.' ' 32
Consequently, Rathbun, Bond, Mountain States, and Com-
puknit, stand for the rule that if a shipper unconditionally
accepts payment in a form other than that authorized by
the C.O.D. contract, such acceptance constitutes ratifica-
tion.'3 3 In which case, the shipper will be prohibited from
successfully collecting the C.O.D. payment from the car-
rier. The underlying rationale in ratification cases is that
the shipper must accept the consequence of its action. 3 4
B. Waiver and Ratification Not Established
As previously stated, if a shipper unconditionally ac-
cepts payment in a form other than that authorized by the
C.O.D. contract, such acceptance constitutes ratifica-
tion.' 35 What happens, however, when the shipper condi-
tionally accepts an unauthorized form of payment. This
was the issue that the New Jersey Supreme Court ad-
dressed in S.B. Penick & Co. v. Triple "M" Transport Co. 136
In S.B. Penick, the carrier, in delivering a C.O.D. shipment,
1" 76 N.Y. at 378; seesupra notes 97-107 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Rathbun.
- Compuhnit, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 918. In Compuknit, the shipper sent merchandige
to the consignee on a C.O.D. basis. The carrier delivered the property and ac-
cepted the consignee's postdated checks. The shipper held and then deposited
these checks for collection. The bank refused payment on account of insufficient
funds, and the shipper sued the carrier. Id. at 919-20.
lso Id at 921.
is, Id
1 Id. at 922.
13-1 See supra notes 97-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of these four
cases.
,:4 See supra note 132 and accompanying text for an example of this rationale.
'. See supra note 133 and accompanying text for an example of this principle.
131 N.J.L. 114, 34 A.2d 898 (1943).
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accepted a postdated check which was contrary to the pro-
visions of the contract.137  The carrier telephoned the
shipper and explained the situation.38 The shipper gave
instructions to forward the check, but indicated that it
would not accept any responsibility for its collection.8 9
After the shipper received the check, the consignee went
into bankruptcy making the check worthless. 140 In 1943,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held the carrier liable for
breach of contract.' 41 The court reasoned that the ship-
per did not unconditionally accept the consignee's
postdated check.1 42  Rather, the shipper accepted the
check upon the condition that it would assume no respon-
sibility for its collection. 43 Consequently, the carrier be-
came liable for the amount of the check when it elected to
take the chance that the consignee was solvent.44
C. Summary
This section analyzed cases in which both the carrier
and shipper violated the terms of the C.O.D. contract. 45
The carrier violated the terms of the C.O.D. contract by
accepting a form of payment other than that authorized
by the contract. 46 Correspondingly, the shipper violated




14 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. In so holding the court stated that the carrier unsuccessfully argued that
the shipper's instructions waived the carrier's duty to collect cash or a currently
dated check. Id. at 899.
142 Id. at 899-900.
"4 Id. at 900.
144 Id.
"' See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in this
section.
.... Id. In Rathbun v. Citizens Steamboat Co., 76 N.Y. 376, 378 (1879) the car-
rier accepted a check instead of cash; see supra notes 97-107 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Rathbun. In Bond Rubber Corp. v. Oates Bros., Inc., 136
Conn. 248, 70 A.2d 115, 116 (1949), the carrier accepted an uncertified check
instead of cash or a certified check; see supra notes 108-118 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Bond. In Mountain States Waterbed Distrib. Inc. v. O.N.C.
Freight Sys. Corp., 44 Colo. App. 433, 614 P.2d 906 (1980), the carrier accepted a
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the terms of the C.O.D. contract by accepting this unau-
thorized payment. 147
Generally, in this situation, courts will not blindly hold
the carrier liable for breach of contract. Instead, they will
look to determine the shipper's response to the unauthor-
ized payment. If the shipper unconditionally accepts and
deposits the unauthorized payment, courts will find
waiver or ratification, which will prevent the shipper from
collecting payment.1 48 Conversely, if the shipper protests
or refuses the unauthorized payment, courts will not find
waiver or ratification, which will allow the shipper to col-
lect.149 In other words, the shipper bears the burden of
screening every check that it receives under a C.O.D. con-
tract. By doing this, courts are protecting the delivery
and transportation industries from unwarranted liability.
III. CONTEMPORARY C.O.D. ISSUES
In contrast to Sections I and II which analyzed cases
where the carrier accepted an unauthorized form of pay-
ment, 5 0 Section III analyzes cases where the carrier ac-
cepts an authorized form of payment, but nevertheless
violates the terms of the C.O.D. contract because that
payment turns out to be a worthless forgery. 51 Typically
in these cases, the carrier is contractually required to ac-
cept a certified check as payment under a C.O.D. order.
The carrier subsequently makes delivery, accepts a certi-
company check instead of a cashier's check; see supra notes 119-126 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Mountain States. In S.B. Pennick, 34 A.2d at 899, the
carrier accepted a postdated check instead of a currently dated check; see supra
notes 136-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of S.B. Pennick.
-7 See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which the shipper also accepted this unauthorized payment.
,4' See supra notes 97-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases in
which the shipper unconditionally accepted an unauthorized payment.
1) See supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case in
which the shipper conditionally accepted an unauthorized payment.
-" See supra notes 21-149 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sections I
and II.
"' See infra notes 152-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section
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fled check as payment, and returns that check to the ship-
per. Later, the shipper discovers that the certified check is
a worthless forgery. In these situations, courts focus on
two primary issues: first, the standard of care required of
a carrier when undertaking to perform collection activities
under a C.O.D. contract; 152 and second, should a carrier
be liable for failing to verify a forged certified check that it
accepted as payment under a C.O.D. contract.1 5 3
A. What Is An Air Carrier's Standard of Care When
Collecting Payment Under a CO. D. Contract
In Video Station v. Frey's Motor Express, Inc. , the shipper
contracted with the carrier to deliver goods on a C.O.D.
basis. The contract required the carrier to release the
goods to the consignee only upon receipt of cash or a cer-
tified check.' 5 The carrier delivered the goods and ac-
cepted a certified check.' 56 This check, however, did not
contain the required signature of an officer of the certify-
ing bank. 57 Further, the check was made payable to
Chase Manhattan Bank, and not to the shipper. 58 As a
result, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Divi-
sion, held the carrier liable for negligently accepting the
check. 5 9
The Video Station court began its analysis by stating that
a carrier's liability for failure to pick up cash or its
'- See infra notes 154-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stan-
dard of care issue.
- See infra notes 203-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of the verifi-
cation issue.
188 N.J. Super. 494, 457 A.2d 1217, 1218 (1983).
Id. at 1219.
I /d.
157 Id.;see Menke v. Board of Educ., 211 N.W.2d 601, 605-06 (Iowa 1973) (certi-
fication of a check requires the written signature of a bank officer).
1r1 Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1219. "Pay to the order of Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A." are words of special endorsement. These words would only be placed on a
check by its holder upon negotiation. This language simply had no purpose being
on the check when it was negotiated by the drawer to the holder. Clearly, this
instrument was a forgery. Id. at 1219-20.
Id. at 1219. The Superior Court of NewJersey, Appellate Division, affirmed
the judgment of the lower court. Id. at 1120.
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equivalent was a contractual matter between the par-
ties.' 60 The parties' collection contract was separate and
unrelated to their delivery contract.' 6 1 The effect of the
parties' collection contract was to make the carrier an
agent of the shipper for the purpose of collecting the
price of the delivered goods. 62 The court then set forth
the carrier's minimum standard of care that it must meet
in performing this collection activity: "An agent to collect
a debt or claim must exercise ordinary care, skill, and dili-
gence in the performance of all the duties incident to the
undertaking, and will be liable to his principal for any loss
which his negligence in this respect may occasion."' 6 3
Thus, the court held that the carrier was under a duty to
exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence in collecting the
payment for the shipper.'6
The court went on to state that the carrier breached its
duty of ordinary care when it accepted a certified check
without the proper bank signature.'6 5 Furthermore, the
notation "Pay to the order of the Chase Manhattan
Bank," had no purpose being on the check.16 6 Conse-
quently, the court held that the check was clearly a forgery
and that the carrier should have discovered this for-
gery. 6 7 In other words, the carrier had notice that the
check was a possible forgery, and therefore had the duty
to make further inquiry.1 6 8
Video Station is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it
- Id. at 1219; see 13 AM. JUR. 2D Carriers § 454 (1964); see also supranote 2 for a
discussion of section 454. See 13 CJ.S. Carers § 186a (1939), see also supra note 4
for a discussion of section 186a.
so, Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1219.
162 Id.; see supra note 7 for a discussion of cases which have held that a C.O.D.
collection contract creates an agency relationship between the shipper and the
carier.
-o Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1219; see 3 CJ.S. Agency § 304a (1973); see also supra
note 12 for a discussion of section 304a.
- Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1219.
Ins Id.
I Id at 1220.
1I17 Id.
,- Id. The court repeated the observation of the trial judge, that "[a] defend-
ant who is in the business of accepting C.O.D. shipments for delivery should rea-
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firmly established the principle that a carrier has a duty of
using ordinary care in collecting payment under a C.O.D.
contract. 69 More importantly, however, Video Station held
that in order to meet this duty of ordinary care, a carrier
must educate its employees on how to recognize the iden-
tifying characteristics of a certified check.' 70  This educa-
tion requirement is significant because courts will now
hold a carrier liable when it accepts a clearly forged certi-
fied check as payment under a C.O.D. contract.
Another case that analyzed the standard of care which a
carrier must use in collecting payment under a C.O.D.
contract was Shockley v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 171 In this
case, the shipper entered into a C.O.D. contract with the
carrier, under which the carrier was required to deliver
the goods and collect cash or a company check. 7 2 On de-
livery, the consignee tendered a company check having
only a hand-written notation of the company's name.17 3
The carrier accepted this check and remitted it to the
shipper.17 4  Subsequently, the check was returned for in-
sufficient funds and the shipper sued the carrier. 75 The
sonably be required to educate its agents and employees as to the identifying
characteristics of a certified check." Id.
lr-i Id. at 1219.
17o Id. at 1220.
17 664 S.W.2d 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
172 Id
17. Id. at 524.
174 Id. On February 18, 1982, the shipper required the carrier to accept cash
from the consignee under the C.O.D. contract. The next morning, the shipper
modified the C.O.D. contract allowing the carrier to accept cash or a company
check. On March 1, 1982, before receiving payment for the initial shipment, the
shipper sent a second C.O.D. order also requiring the carrier to accept cash or a
company check. A few days later, the shipper received the consignee's company
check that the carrier had accepted as payment for the first C.O.D. order. The
check was for the correct amount but was not imprinted with the consignee's com-
pany name. Instead, the check had only a hand-written notation of the con-
signee's company name. The shipper became concerned with the crude
appearance of this check and took it immediately to its bank to determine the
check's validity. The bank informed the shipper that the account from which the
check was written was closed. The shipper attempted to stop the carrier from
delivering the second C.O.D. shipment, but it was too late. The shipper in this
instance lost the value of both shipments. Id. at 523-24.
37 Id. at 524.
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Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
for the carrier.' 76 The court stated that:
placing responsibility upon UPS [carrier] to ascertain the
sufficiency of the checks received to satisfy the require-
ments of the order, in light of the directions given to UPS,
creates an undue burden upon UPS in performing its du-
ties. UPS is not involved in the banking business and is
not in a position to credit or discredit negotiable instru-
ments beyond their duty of examining the face of the
check to determine whether it comports to the instructions
given UPS. 177
According to the Shockley court, in order to satisfy the
definition of ordinary care, a carrier must examine the
face of each check to make sure that it comports with the
shipper's instructions.1 78 In other words, a carrier must
compare the actual payment that it receives with the pay-
ment that it is authorized to collect under the C.O.D. con-
tract. It is interesting to note, that in this set of facts,
ordinary care did not include the duty of verifying the suf-
ficiency of the checks.
The most recent case to discuss the standard of care
that a carrier must use in collecting payment under a
C.O.D. contract was Littleton Stamp & Coin Co. v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc. 7 9 In this case, the carrier entered into a con-
tract with the shipper, agreeing to make two shipments of
coins and to collect the price of the coins from the con-
signee.180 The contracts authorized the carrier to accept a
certified check as payment for the coins.' 8 ' Upon delivery
the carrier accepted, but did not verify, the certified
checks.18 2 It was later determined, however, that these
" Id. at 524-25.
177 Id.
17m Id. at 525.
1" 778 F.2d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 1985).
' Id.
I, Id
1"a Id. at 54-55. The consignee originally arrived at the airport with a single
check covering both the price of the goods and the C.O.D. charges. The carrier
refused to accept this check and required the consignee to return the next day
with separate checks. Id at 57.
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checks were worthless forgeries. 83 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment for the shipper, and held that a standard
of reasonable care applied to the carrier's contractual ob-
ligation to collect.18 4
The First Circuit began its analysis of this case by enun-
ciating the two duties a carrier assumes by delivering
goods on a C.O.D. basis: the common law duty to trans-
port the goods, and the contractual duty to collect pay-
ment. 85 The First Circuit agreed with the approach of
other courts which utilize the principles of agency law in
determining the standard of care that a carrier assumes in
contractually agreeing to collect payment on a C.O.D. or-
der.8 6 Accordingly, an agent employed to collect money
due the shipper has a duty of using reasonable care in
making such collections.'8 17 In Littleton, the First Circuit
never reached the conclusion of whether Delta Airlines
exercised reasonable care, when it failed to verify pay-
ment.1 8 8 Instead, the court merely held that the issue was
inappropriate for summary judgment and remanded the
case back to the trial court.'8 9
" id. at 55.
'" Id. at 57-58.
IN! Id at 55; see supra note 7 for a discussion of cases which have cited this
principle.
-6 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 55.
187 Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 426 (1957); see also supra note 12
for a discussion of section 426. The First Circuit then made a distinction between
cases in which the carrier attempted to follow the shipper's instructions. Compare
Littleton, 778 F.2d at 55 (the carrier attempted to follow the instructions) with Jos-
peh Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708 (1928) (the
shipper did not endorse a specific alternative to cash) and Murray v. Warner, 55
N.H. 546 (1875) (the carrier obtained no payment) and National Van Lines v.
Rich Plan Corp., 385 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1967)(the carrier departed from the ship-
per's instructions by accepting a company check rather than cash). The First Cir-
cuit conceded that when a carrier fails to obtain any payment or when it accepts a
form of payment not authorized by the shipper, the carrier is liable. Littleton, 778
F.2d at 56.
Littleton, 778 F.2d at 57-58.
Id. at 55. The district court granted the shipper's motion for summary judg-
ment on the theory that the carrier is strictly liable to the shipper when it defaults
under a C.O.D. contract to collect a certain sum. The First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals remanded the case back to the district court because application of strict
In so holding, the First Circuit went on to list the fac-
tors, both pro and con, that the trial court should con-
sider on remand in determining whether Delta Airlines
exercised reasonable care. 190 In Delta's favor, suggesting
that the carrier acted reasonably, the court stated that
first, the shipper made a clear choice to have the checks
made out in its own name, not that of Delta. 19' Second,
the plane carrying the coins arrived at its destination after
6 p.m. on Friday evening. 92 These two factors indicate
that Delta could not have verified the checks. Third, let-
ters between the shipper and the consignee suggested
that the shipper had already cleared the consignee's certi-
fied checks.19 3
Not all factors, however, lead to the conclusion that
Delta acted reasonably. 94 For example, Delta refused to
turn over the coins on Friday evening because the con-
signee had only one check covering both the shipping
charges and the cost of the coins. 195 Delta required the
consignee to return the next day with separate checks
before it released the coins.' 96 Therefore, it might have
been reasonable for Delta to have verified the certified
checks. 97 Secondly, it was Delta's standard practice to
verify checks in excess of $10,000.198 Consequently, there
liability was inappropriate in this situation. Instead, the relevant inquiry was
whether the carrier acted with reasonable care. Id.
- Id at 56-57.
'91 Id at 56. Airlines offer shippers a choice of having certified checks made
payable to the airline or the shipper. This is significant because airlines only verify
checks made payable to the airline. Airlines do not verify checks made payable to
the shipper. This is because it is very difficult for an airline to verify a certified
check when it is neither a drawer nor payee of the check Id.
' Id. Even if the carrier wanted to, it could not have verified the check on




Id If the consignee was able to obtain a new check during the weekend, it
might have been reasonable to charge the carrier with the responsibility of verify-
ing that check. Id.
197 Id.
i's Id Carrier's Standard Practice states: "If the instrument tendered is for
more than $10,000 ... verify with the issuing bank or agency." This Standard
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were also arguments in favor of finding that Delta did not
act reasonably when it failed to verify payment.19
As demonstrated by Video Station, Shockley, and Littleton,
a carrier acts as an agent of the shipper when it contracts
to collect payment on a C.O.D. order. As such, a carrier
must exercise ordinary or reasonable care in the perform-
ance of all duties incident to this undertaking. According
to Video Station, ordinary care requires the carrier to iden-
tify the relevant characteristics of a certified check. 20 0 Ac-
cording to Shockley, ordinary care further requires the
carrier to compare the actual payment that it receives with
the payment that it is authorized to collect under the
C.O.D. contract.20 ' And finally, Littleton sets forth a list of
factors that a court should consider in determining
whether a carrier exercised reasonable care.20 2
B. Should An Air Carrier Be Liable For Failing to Verify a
Forged Certified Check that it Accepted as Payment
Under a CO. D. Contract?
The second contemporary issue facing courts is
whether a carrier's duty of ordinary or reasonable care
also includes the obligation to verify the solvency of a cer-
tified check.20 3 This issue most frequently arises in cases
where the carrier fails to verify the sufficiency of a forged
certified check that it accepts as payment under a C.O.D.
contract. On the one hand, the shipper claims that it
should be allowed to collect payment from the carrier be-
cause the purpose of a C.O.D. shipment is to ensure that
Practice is part of the carrier's C.O.D. contract. Therefore, if the shipper relied
on this practice in choosing the method of payment, a court could find the car-
rier's actions unreasonable. Id.
11- Id.
2- Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1220; see supra notes 154-170 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Video Station.
21,, Shockley, 664 S.W.2d at 525; see supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Shockley.
ul,, Littleton, 778 F.2d at 56-57; see supra notes 179-199 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Littleton.
2" See infra notes 204-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
the shipper receives liquid assets.20 4 On the other hand,
the carrier claims that it should not be required to pay the
shipper because it is not a bank, and thus, is not in a posi-
tion to credit or discredit negotiable instruments. 20 5  So
far, the limited number of courts that have addressed this
issue have tended to favor the carrier's argument over
that of the shipper.0 6
On February 15, 1985, the Texas Court of Appeals (San
Antonio) decided Duderstadt Surveyors Supply, Inc. v. Alamo
Express, Inc. 207 In Duderstadt the shipper specifically au-
thorized the carrier to accept a certified check under a
C.O.D. contract.28 Accordingly, the carrier delivered the
goods, accepted a certified check, and presented the check
to the shipper.20 9 The shipper, in turn, deposited the
check.210 The bank, however, refused to pay the check be-
cause it was a forgery.21 I The shipper then sued the car-
rier.212 The Texas Court of Appeals held that there was
more than adequate evidence to support the trial court's
determination that the carrier was not liable.2 1
In Duderstadt the Court of Appeals began its analysis by
stating that there is not any common law duty on a carrier
- See infra notes 217-234 and accompanying text for a discussion of Swest.
20r See supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of Shockley.
-00 See infra notes 256-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of American
Airlines.
686 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 352-53.
-o Id at 353. The uncontroverted facts in this case are that the shipper sent
survey equipment under a C.O.D. contract to Petroleos Mexicanos in care of its
agent, Raul Buenrostro. Upon arrival of the equipment in the carrier's terminal, a
man purporting to be Raul Buenrostro picked up the goods consigned to Pe-
troleos Mexicanos and tendered a purported cashier's check as payment. Later,
upon presentment for collection, the bank determined that the check was a for-
gery and refused payment. Subsequently, the shipper unsuccessfully demanded
payment from the carrier and initiated this suit. Id at 352-53.
210 Id
'1 Id. The cashier's check tendered by consignee showed nothing on its face
that would have led the carrier to question its authenticity. Id. at 355.
• Id. at 353.
vs Id at 355. The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Id. at 356.
1987] COMMENTS 531
532 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [53
to act as the shipper's collecting agent.2 4 Rather, a car-
rier must use "reasonable care and skill in making such
collections in accordance with the directions of the princi-
ple. ' 2 5 The carrier in Duberstadt met the duty of reason-
able care because the cashier's check showed nothing on
its face that would have led the carrier to question its
authenticity. 6
Three months later, on May 16, 1985, the Texas Court
of Appeals (Dallas) decided Swest, Inc. v. American Airlines,
Inc.21 7 Swest is significant because it was the first case to
hold that reasonable care includes the duty to verify a cer-
tified check.21 8 In Swest the shipper sent a number of gold
and silver shipments to the consignee via American Air-
lines. 9 On the third and fourth shipments, the carrier
accepted payment from the consignee with what appeared
to be genuine certified checks, but in reality the bank cer-
tifications were forged.220 In both instances, the carrier
turned the goods over to the consignee around midnight
and made no attempt to verify the forged certified
214 Id. at 355; see National Van Lines v. Rich Plan Corp., 385 F.2d 800, 802 (5th
Cir. 1967) (a carrier bears no common law duty to act as the shipper's collecting
agent. The C.O.D. obligation is a special service which is outside the scope of the
carrier's public service); see also supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of National Van Lines.
2-. Duderstadt, 686 S.W.2d at 355; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 426
(1957); see also supra note 12 for a discussion of section 426.
2-'C Duderstadt, 686 S.W.2d at 355; see supra notes 154-170 and accompanying
text for a discussion that reasonable care required the carrier to identify the rele-
vant characteristics of a certificed check; see also supra notes 17 1-178 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion that reasonable care requires that the carrier to
compare the actual payment that it receives with the payment that it is authorized
to collect under the C.O.D. contract. In Duderstadt, the Court of Appeals held that
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the carrier exercised
reasonable care and diligence in forwarding the cashier's check. The cashier's
check that the carrier accepted and tendered to the shipper showed nothing on its
face to question its authenticity. Both the shipper and the bank handled and ac-
cepted the check as being geniune. Duderstadt, 686 S.W.2d at 355.
' 694 S.W.2d 399 (rex. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd, 707 S.W.2d 545 (rex. 1986).
21, Id. at 402. Because Swest was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, it is
being discussed only for its historical value and to view one court's errant view of
C.O.D. contract analysis.
v" Id. at 401.
-twId.
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checks. 2  Subsequently, the bank dishonored these
checks, and the shipper sued the carrier.222 The Texas
Court of Appeals held the carrier liable for breach of con-
tract because it failed to verify the certified checks.223
The Swest court based its decision on three principles.
First, the court relied on the holding of the New York
Court of Appeals in Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine,
Inc.224 In Joseph Mogul, the court held that a carrier which
accepts a certified check as payment under a C.O.D. con-
tract has the duty to verify that check. 2 5 Furthermore, a
C.O.D. contract requires the carrier to accept a certified
check, "and not a mere pretense of one. ' 22 6 Second, the
court believed that not holding the carrier liable in this
situation would undermine the policy and purpose behind
a C.O.D. shipment. 27 The policy behind a C.O.D. ship-
ment is to prevent the carrier from making delivery with-
out collecting. 228 The purpose behind this policy is to
ensure that the shipper receives liquid assets, and not a
contract claim against a consignee who may be insol-
-21 Id. There were not any problems with the first two shipments when payment
was made by a cashier's check and a certified personal check. It was only on the
third and fourth shipments that the certified checks turned out to be forged. Id.
222 Id. At the trial court, Swest alleged breach of contract, fraud, negligence,
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of duty to comply with
reasonable commercial standards. These causes were tried before a jury which
found that the carrier did not breach its C.O.D. contract with the shipper. Ac-
cordingly, the trial court entered judgment for the carrier. Subsequently, the
shipper appealed. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the carrier
breached its contract with the shipper as a matter of law. Id.
-22 Id. at 402. The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, and rendered judgment
for the shipper. Id. at 404.
-2 Id.; see Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine, Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E.
708 (1928); see also supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Joseph Mogul.
225 Joseph Mogul, 159 N.E. at 709.
226 Id.
-27 Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402.
-1 Id. The policy is to "assure that the carrier cannot make absolute delivery
without collecting, thereby leaving the shipper to his recourse against the con-
signee." Id., quoting National Van Lines v. Rich Plan Corp., 385 F.2d 800, 803
(5th Cir. 1967); see supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
National Van Lines.
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vent.229 Third, the court reasoned that requiring verifica-
tion is just an extension of Video Station.23 ° In Video Station
the court held that a C.O.D. carrier must inspect a pur-
ported certified check for facial defects. 23 ' Now under
Swest, a C.O.D. carrier must verify those certified checks
which pass visual inspection. 3 2 Consequently, Video Sta-
tion should not be read to mean that reasonable care is
satisfied when a C.O.D. carrier only inspects a certified
check to see if all relevant characteristics are present.233
Instead, under Swest, reasonable care is satisfied only
when a C.O.D. carrier inspects and verifies each certified
check which it collects as payment on behalf of the
shipper.234
On November 27, 1985, the First Circuit Court of Ap-
peals criticized the Swest opinion in Littleton Stamp & Coin
Co. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 23' In Littleton, the carrier entered
into a C.O.D. contract with the shipper agreeing to make
two shipments of coins. 236 The contract authorized the
carrier to accept certified checks as payment.237 Upon de-
"- Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402. The Swest Court stated the purpose behind the
policy of a C.O.D. contract as follows:
The seller generally utilizes a C.O.D. contract because he either
does not trust the buyer or does not intend to advance credit...
[W]hen utilizing the C.O.D. method the seller really indicates he
wants liquid assets, not a contract claim against a distant buyer who
may be insolvent, litigious, dishonest, or all three.
Id., quoting Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 1370, 1379 (9th Cir.
1978).
"-311 Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402; see Video Station v. Frey's Motor Express, Inc., 188
NJ. Super. 494, 457 A.2d 1217, 1220 (1983); see also supra notes 154-170 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Video Station.
2-1 Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402, construing Video Station, 457 A.2d at 1220.
232 Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402.
2' Id. It should be emphasized again that the holding of the Texas Court of
Appeals (Dallas) was later reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, 707 S.W.2d 545
(Tex. 1986). As such, it is only being discussed for its historical value and to view
one court's errant view of C.O.D. contract analysis.
• 778 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1985); see supra notes 179-199 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Littleton as it relates to a carrier's standard of care in performing
its collection activity under a C.O.D. contract.
Littleton, 778 F.2d at 54.
• Id.
livery the carrier accepted, but did not verify the certified
checks.238 It was later determined that these checks were
worthless forgeries. 23 9 The trial court awarded summary
judgment to the shipper on the ground that a C.O.D. car-
rier that defaults on its obligation to collect a sum certain
is strictly liable to the shipper.240 The First Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that
strict liability is inappropriate and remanded this case for
further procedings.24'
The First Circuit began its analysis by holding that rea-
sonable care governs a carrier's collection duty.242 More-
over, the First Circuit also held that even though the
carrier did not verify the certified checks, this failure alone
did not establish a breach of the carrier's contractual duty
to collect payment, and thus subject it to a summary judg-
ment verdict.243 Consequently, unlike Swest, Littleton holds
that reasonable care does not include the absolute duty
for a carrier to verify the sufficiency of a certified check.244
Instead, the circumstances of each case determine
whether the exercise of reasonable care includes the duty
to verify.245
In beginning its criticism of Swest, the First Circuit
stated that the policy behind a C.O.D. contract is to assure
the shipper that the carrier will not make delivery without
collecting payment. 246 According to the First Circuit, this
"3 Id. at 54-55.
2'9 id. at 55.
2 40 Id.
241 Id.
2' Id; see supra notes 179-199 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lit-
tleon as it relates to a carrier's standard of care in performing its collection activity
under a C.O.D. contract.
24 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 56.
• Id. But see Swest, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 694 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985); see also supra notes 217-234 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion that reasonable care requires a carrier to verify the sufficiency of a certified
check which it collects as payment on behalf of the shipper under a C.O.D.
contract.
"-. Littleton, 778 F.2d at 56.
-_" Id. at 57; see National Van Lines v. Rich Plan Corp., 385 F.2d 800, 803 (5th
Cir. 1967); see also supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a discussion that
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policy applies to situations in which the carrier is contrac-
tually obligated to collect only cash.247 This policy does
not apply, as the Swest court believes, to situations in
which the carrier is contractually obligated to collect cash
or a certified check.248 When a shipper has decided to
gamble by accepting a form of payment other than cash, it
cannot later shift this increased risk of uncollectability to
the carrier.249 As support for this argument the First Cir-
cuit relied on Shockley v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,250 for the
proposition that placing responsibility upon a carrier to
ascertain the sufficiency of a certified check creates an un-
due burden on the carrier performing its collection du-
ties. Carriers are not in the banking business and thus are
not in a position to credit or discredit negotiable
instruments. 251
After the decision in Littleton, the law in Texas on the
subject of whether reasonable care included the duty to
verify was in a state of great confusion. On the one hand,
the Texas Court of Appeals in Swest, Inc. v. American Air-
lines, Inc.,252 held that the exercise of reasonable care in-
cludes the absolute duty to verify a certified check.25 3 On
the other hand, the First Circuit in Littleton Stamp & Coin
Co. v. Delta Airlines, Inc. ,254 held that the circumstances of
each case determine whether the exercise of reasonable
care includes the duty to verify. 255 This, in essence, was
the issue before the Texas Supreme Court when it de-
the policy behind a C.O.D. transaction is to assure the shipper that the carrier will
not make delivery without collecting payment.
-7 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 57.
.48 Id.
241) Id
2!91 664 S.W.2d 523,524-25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); see also supra notes 171-178 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Shockley.
251 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 57.
- 694 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), retld, 707 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1986); see
supra notes 217-234 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court of Ap-
peal's holding.
•.,r.l Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402.
2- 778 F.2d at 53; see supra notes 235-251 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Littleton.
,5 Littleton, 778 F.2d at 56.
cided American Airlines, Inc. v. Swest, Inc. on appeal.256 In
determining this issue, the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the Texas Court of Appeal's hold-
ing.257 Consequently, under existing Texas law the
carrier does not have an absolute duty to verify a certified
check.258
The Texas Supreme Court was unimpressed with the
Court of Appeal's argument that the confidence of the
shipper would be undermined if the carrier did not verify
a certified check.259 Rather, the court stated that to re-
quire verification would significantly undermine the ship-
ping and delivery industries.2 6 0 For example, if the court
required verification of a certified check, than an air ex-
press shipment could not be delivered after banking
hours. 26 1 Furthermore, the shipper always has the option
of protecting itself by demanding that payment be made
only in cash.262 Consequently, on the basis of these two
arguments, the Texas Supreme Court held that reason-
able care does not include the absolute duty to verify a
certified check.26 3 Instead, the circumstances of each case
dictate whether the exercise of reasonable care includes
the duty to verify.264
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment analyzed cases concerning a carrier's
contractual liability for nondelivery or misdelivery under
a C.O.D. contract. Section I presented a history on how
courts have analyzed significant C.O.D. cases wherein the
2 707 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1986).
2' Id. at 548.
'- Id at 546.
U") Id. at 547. The Court of Appeals reasoned that, "to hold that a C.O.D. car-
tier need not verify purported certified checks ... would significantly undermine
the confidence of shippers that they would receive cash or its equivalent in pay-
ment for their C.O.D. shipments." Swest, 694 S.W.2d at 402.
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shipper entered into a C.O.D. contract, and the carrier
subsequently made delivery, but then failed to remit full
payment back to the shipper.26 5 In these cases, courts
generally held the carrier liable for breach of contract. In
so holding, courts reasoned that because a carrier had
complete discretion in determining whether to enter into
a C.O.D. contract with the shipper, the carrier was held to
strict compliance with its agreement. 266 Consequently, if
a carrier breached the agreement it was liable to the ship-
per for whatever could have been collected had the duty
been fulfilled.267
In contrast to Section I that analyzed cases in which
only the carrier violated the terms of the C.O.D. contract,
Section II analyzed cases in which both the carrier and the
shipper violated the terms of the C.O.D. contract.2 8 In
these cases, the carrier violated the terms of the C.O.D.
contract by accepting a form of payment other than that
authorized in the contract.2 69 Correspondingly, the ship-
per violated the C.O.D. contract by accepting and depos-
iting this unauthorized payment. Generally, in this
situation, courts did not blindly hold the carrier liable for
breach of contract. Instead, they looked to determine the
shipper's response to the unauthorized payment. If the
"-'1 See supra notes 21-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section 1.
211 Id.; see National Van Lines v. Rich Plan Corp., 385 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir.
1967); see also supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of National
Van Lines; see Anthony v. American Express Co., 188 N.C. 407, 124 S.E. 753, 755
(1924); see also supra 36-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of Anthony; see
Nuside Metal Prod., Inc. v. Eazor Express, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 593, 152 A.2d 275,
279 (1959); see also supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Nuside.
2;7 See National Van Lines, 385 F.2d at 802; see also supra notes 75-88 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of National Van Lines; see Okin v. Railway Express
Agency, 24 N.J. Misc. 8, 44 A.2d 896 (1945); see also supra notes 51-57 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Okin; see Joseph Mogul, Inc. v. C. Lewis Lavine,
Inc., 247 N.Y. 20, 159 N.E. 708 (1928); see also supra notes 42-50 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion ofJoseph Mogul; see Herrin Transp. Co. v. Robert E. Olson
Co., 325 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see also supra notes 66-74 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of Herrin.
"111 See supra notes 96-149 and accompanying text for a discussion of Section II.
." See supra note 146 for a list of cases where the carrier violated the C.O.D.
contract by accepting an unauthorized payment.
COMMENTS
shipper unconditionally accepted and deposited the unau-
thorized payment, courts found waiver or ratification,
which prevented the shipper from collecting payment
from the carrier.270 Conversely, if the shipper protested
or refused the unauthorized payment, courts did not find
waiver or ratification, which allowed the shipper to collect
payment from the carrier.7 t In other words, the shipper
carried the burden of screening every check that it re-
ceived under a C.O.D. contract. By doing this, courts
protected the delivery and transportation industry from
unwarranted liability.
With this background in mind, Section III analyzed two
contemporary issues involving C.O.D. contracts. 7 2 The
first issue concerned the standard of care required of a
carrier when undertaking to perform collection activities
under a C.O.D. contract.2 7 3 In analyzing this issue courts
determined that the principles of agency law governed a
carrier's obligation to collect payment under a C.O.D.
contract. 74  As such, carriers were under a duty of using
ordinary or reasonable care in making such collection
efforts .27
The second issue that Section III addressed was
whether a carrier was liable for failing to verify a forged
certified check that it accepted as payment under a C.O.D.
270 See supra notes 97-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases where
the shipper unconditionally accepted an unauthorized payment.
•27 See supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case
where the shipper did not unconditionally accept an unauthorized payment.
272 See supra notes 150-264 and accompanying text for a dicussion of Section III.
27 See supra notes 154-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the stan-
dard of care analysis.
.-4 See supra note 7 for a list of cases which haye held that a carrier's collection
duty is governed by agency principles.
- See, e.g., Littleton Stamp & Coin Co. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 778 F.2d 53 (1st
Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 179-199 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Littleton; see Shockley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 664 S.W.2d 523 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983); see also supra notes 171-178 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Shockley; see Video Station v. Frey's Motor Express, Inc., 188 NJ. Super. 494, 457
A.2d 1217 (1983); see also supra notes 154-170 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Video Station.
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contract.27 6 In other words, does ordinary or reasonable
care include the duty to verify certified checks? At work in
this situation were two conflicting principles: first, the
protection of the carrier's confidence that it was not liable
when it fulfilled its obligation to collect payment under a
C.O.D. contract;27 7 and second, the protection of the
shipper's confidence that it will be paid for orders it initi-
ates under a C.O.D. contract.27 8 The leading case in this
area held that the carrier's confidence prevailed, and that
reasonable care did not include the duty to verify the suffi-
ciency of a certified check.27 9
The holding in this leading case is correct because it is
fair to both the carrier and shipper. From the carrier's
perspective this rule is fair because requiring verification
undermines the effectiveness of the shipping and delivery
industries. For example, if the shipper sent a package air
express and that package arrived after banking hours, the
carrier would be required to postpone delivery until the
next day in order to get verification. Verification elimi-
nates the timesaving advantage a shipper gains in sending
a package air express. Also, a verification requirement
cuts down on the number of hours that deliveries could
be made during a day. Consequently, the rule not requir-
ing verification by the carrier is fair from the carrier's
point of view.
In addition, this rule is fair from the shipper's perspec-
tive because the rule only states that ordinary or reason-
able care does not include the duty to verify. This rule
does not foreclose the opportunity for the shipper to con-
tractually require the carrier to use a higher level of care
than ordinary or reasonable care. For example, if a ship-
per is concerned with uncollectability, it can negotiate a
• l, See supra notes 203-264 and accompanying text for a discussion of the verifi-
cation issue.
277 See supra notes 207-216, 235-251 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the cases supporting the protection of the carrier's confidence.
•.78 See supra notes 217-234 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case
supporting the protection of the shipper's confidence.
%-, American Airlines, Inc. v. Swest, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1986).
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specific provision in the C.O.D. contract requiring the car-
rier to verify payment. Alternatively, the shipper can send
a C.O.D. order and require the carrier to accept cash.
Thus, if the shipper is concerned with untrustworthiness,
it must bear the burden of including safety provisions in
the C.O.D. contract. Consequently, the rule not requiring
verification by the carrier is also fair from the shipper's
point of view. Therefore, it follows that a carrier should
not be liable for failing to verify a forged certified check
that it accepts as payment under a C.O.D. contract.

